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Abstract
We investigate the feasibility of horizontal mergers in a homoge-
neous triopoly where rms compete in quantities and production is
polluting the environment. We show that the degree of alignment
between private and social incentives increases in the intensity of pol-
lution.
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1 Introduction
The cornerstone of the lively discussion about horizontal mergers is the so
called e¢ ciency defense, whereby e¢ ciency gains driven by the merger may
indeed more than o¤set the negative consequences on consumer surplus, and
therefore justify the merger itself (see Salant et al., 1983, Perry and Porter,
1985, Gaudet and Salant, 1991, 1992 and Farrell and Shapiro, 1990, inter
alia). Conversely, few e¤orts have been carried out to investigate the social
consequences of mergers in markets where production entails a negative en-
vironmental externality. In this vein, some contributions consider the e¤ects
on emission permits policies and mergers. For instance, in a perfectly com-
petitive industry with pollution permits, Hennessy and Roosen (1999) show
that permit incentives may motivate a merger of otherwise independent rms.
Ehrhart et al. (2008) investigate the EU emission trading law. Their analysis
sheds light on loopholes that foster tacit collusion in oligopolistic Cournot
markets.
In this note, we revisit the well known issue of the rmsincentive to merge
in a Cournot triopoly, by combining the e¢ ciency e¤ect based on production
costs (in particular, on average cost) with the environmental implications of
the industry output contraction that goes along with the merger in a polluting
market. We establish the necessary and su¢ cient conditions for the merger of
two rms out of the original three to be both prot- and welfare-improving.
This situation takes place given a su¢ ciently large sunk costs.
Our results show that an increase in polluting e¤ects of production con-
tributes to align private and social incentives towards horizontal mergers.
The intuition behind this is to be found in the fact that the negative e¤ect
on consumer surplus is more than o¤set by both the raise in industry prots
and the fall of pollution.
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2 The model
We consider an industry with n 2 f2; 3g rms competing à la Cournot. They
produce the same homogeneous good, and have symmetric production costs:
C = cqn + F; (1)
where qn is the quantity produced by each rm, c > 0 and F > 0 is a sunk
cost: The inverse demand is linear:
p = a  nqn; (2)
and the prots of each rm are:
n = pqn   cqn   F: (3)
The production of the nal output goes along with a negative environmental
externality, which is a linear-quadratic function of the output:
En = bnqn + vn
2q2n; (4)
with b; v > 0 measuring the (linear and quadratic, resp.) negative impact of
production on the environment. We assume that rms do not internalise the
environmental e¤ects of their decisions, and therefore each of them chooses
the output level so as to non cooperatively maximise prots (3). Consumer
surplus is measured by
CSn =
n2q2n
2
; (5)
while social welfare is dened as the sum of industry prots and consumer
surplus, minus pollution:
Wn =
nX
n + CSn   E: (6)
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3 Results
Throughout the analysis, for notational simplicity we shall dene the market
size as m = a   c. Initially we consider the pre-merger scenario, in which
n = 3. The market equilibrium is the traditional Cournot result given by:
q3 =
m
4
: (7)
Individual equilibrium prots are:
3 =
m2
16
  F: (8)
Correspondingly, consumer surplus is:
CS3 =
9m2
32
; (9)
and social welfare is:
W3 =
3m [m (5  6v)  8b]
32
  3F: (10)
Consider now the case where two rms decide to merge, so that n = 2: In
order for the merger to give rise to an e¢ ciency gain, we pose that the rm
resulting from the merger bears a single xed cost F .
Now the Cournot-Nash individual equilibrium output is:
q2 =
m
3
; (11)
while individual equilibrium prots are:
2 =
m2
9
  F; (12)
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consumer surplus is given by:
CS2 =
2m2
9
; (13)
and nally social welfare is:
W2 =
2m [2m (1  v)  3b]
9
  2F: (14)
We are now in a position to evaluate whether the merger is socially ef-
cient in an industry where production pollutes the environment. One can
set out by noting that the incentive compatibility constraint in order for two
rms to merge spontaneously is 2   23 > 0: This condition holds for:
F > bF = m2
72
: (15)
Given the strict prot-seeking behaviour of rms, condition (15) obviously
replicates what is known from the previous literature mentioned in the in-
troduction. We then need to establish the conditions such that merging is
socially e¢ cient. This can be done by comparing the social welfare levels
with 2 or 3 rms. We have that:
W2  W3 = m [m (34v   7) + 24b] + 288F
288
> 0 (16)
for all
F > eF = max0; m [m (7  34v)  24b]
288

: (17)
On the basis of (17), we may establish
Lemma 1 The su¢ cient condition for the merger to be socially e¢ cient for
all F > 0 is v > 7=34:
The above lemma amounts to saying that, if the externality is su¢ ciently
steep in the industry output, then the merger is always socially welcome as
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the reduction in consumer surplus implied by shrinking industry output is
more than o¤set by the parallel reduction in pollution.
If instead v < 7=34; then
max

0;
m [m (7  34v)  24b]
288

=
m [m (7  34v)  24b]
288
for all
m > m =
24b
7  34v : (18)
Now note that m [m (7  34v)  24b] =288 is monotonically decreasing in
both b and v, which is entirely reasonable as these two parameters jointly
determine the negative impact of the externality on welfare. In particular,
if b and v were both nil (i.e., if the technology were fully green), then eF =
7m2=288 > bF ; so that for any F 2  bF ; eF the merger would be convenient
for rms but socially harmful and the antitrust authority should intervene
to block it. In the general case in which b; v > 0; the ranking between the
two critical thresholds of F may indeed change, with
bF   eF _ 24b  (3  34v)m > 0 (19)
for all
m > m = max

0;
24b
3  34v

: (20)
which again depends on the size of v. Taking into account that, in general,
24b
3  34v >
24b
7  34v ; (21)
private and social incentives towards the merger can be appreciate by refer-
ring to Figure 1.
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Figure 1: Merger incentives
6
-
F
(0; 0)
m
mm
bF
eF
I II
We are interested in the portion of the space fm;Fg lying above bF ;
wherein a private incentive to merge does exist. In region I; private and
social incentives are aligned; therefore, the antitrust authority should allow
the merger to take place. In region II, there is a conict as rms would like
to merge but the antitrust authority should intervene to prevent them from
doing so. Additionally,
@
 eF   bF
@v
< 0;
@
 eF   bF
@b
< 0; (22)
that is, the region wherein the conict exists shrinks as the weights of the
environmental implications of production increase, while the opposite applies
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concerning region I. This discussion can be summarised in
Proposition 2 The presence of a negative environmental externality con-
tributes to align private and social incentives towards horizontal mergers.
The source of this result is to be found in the fact that the negative e¤ect
on consumer surplus is counterbalanced by two forces, namely, the increase
in industry prots and the reduction in pollution. This simple modeliza-
tion, inserting externalities in the standard approach to merger analysis in a
Cournot industry points thus to the need of a close coordination between au-
thorities in charge of antitrust themes on one side and environmental issues
on the other.
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